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Abstract 
A four-year period during which hotels in Columbus, Georgia, were delisted by online travel agencies—and 
subsequently relisted—created a natural experiment that allows comparison of hotel performance before, 
during, and after the delisting period. This report summarizes two already published analyses of the 
hotels’ performance and then extends one of those analytical approaches to develop a more 
comprehensive picture of revenue outcomes. An initial study compared changes in room-nights sold by 
Columbus’s hotels with those in neighboring Phenix City, Alabama, which undoubtedly absorbed a 
substantial amount of Columbus’s lost OTA business. This study found that the loss of room-nights in 
Columbus was relatively small during the delisting, and it concluded that occupancy in the city’s hotel 
market roared back once its hotels were relisted. The later analyses present more nuanced picture using 
indices rather than absolute figures, as well as including the relative effects on revenue per available room 
(and thus both average daily rate and occupancy). This approach finds that while occupancy did, indeed, 
flourish, that came at a cost of diminished ADR during the delisting. Moreover, RevPAR did not entirely 
recover when the hotels were relisted. 
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ExEcutivE Summary
A four-year period during which hotels in Columbus, Georgia, were delisted by online travel agencies—and subsequently relisted—created a natural experiment that allows comparison of hotel performance before, during, and after the delisting period. This report summarizes two already published 
analyses of the hotels’ performance and then extends one of those analytical approaches to 
develop a more comprehensive picture of revenue outcomes. An initial study compared 
changes in room-nights sold by Columbus’s hotels with those in neighboring Phenix City, 
Alabama, which undoubtedly absorbed a substantial amount of Columbus’s lost OTA 
business. This study found that the loss of room-nights in Columbus was relatively small 
during the delisting, and it concluded that occupancy in the city’s hotel market roared back 
once its hotels were relisted. The later analyses present more nuanced picture using indices 
rather than absolute figures, as well as including the relative effects on revenue per available 
room (and thus both average daily rate and occupancy). This approach finds that while 
occupancy did, indeed, flourish, that came at a cost of diminished ADR during the delisting. 
Moreover, RevPAR did not entirely recover when the hotels were relisted.
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Living without OTAs–
A Summary of the Performance Impacts Resulting from the OTA 
Delisting of Columbus, Georgia 
by Christopher K. Anderson and Saram Han
Two studies recently published in the Cornell Hospitality Quarterly summarize a unique natural experiment in which hotels in an entire city were delisted from all online travel agents for more than four years. This occurred when the city of Columbus, Georgia, was victorious in its lawsuit (and subsequent appeal) against 
several OTAs in which the city alleged improper collection and remittance of accommodation 
taxes. The Columbus case is one of more than 90-plus cases filed against OTAs for 
accommodation tax collection. As a result of the lawsuit, all OTAs removed all hotel listings 
for the city of Columbus from the end of 2008 through 2012. This report summarizes the 
findings relating to hotel rate and occupancy presented by these two papers, highlights some 
of the insights, and then provides additional analysis to extend calculations of the effects on 
the hotels’ revenues.
4 The Center for Hospitality Research • Cornell University
Study One:  
Absolute Occupancy and Rate Effects 
The first study, by Brumby McLeod and his col-
leagues, estimates the impact of OTA delisting by 
looking primarily at demand changes in nearby 
Phenix City, Alabama (across the river and state line 
from Columbus).1 They estimate the effect of the 
delisting in Columbus by calculating the room-nights 
that Phenix City itself lost in 2012, when Columbus 
was relisted at the OTAs. That number was substan-
tial for the relatively small Phenix City market, as it 
lost about 18,000 room-nights per year when Colum-
bus came back on-line, or just under 15 percent of the 
occupancy Phenix City might have expected. McLeod 
and colleagues then extended this post-relisting loss 
backward, expressing it as the gain to Phenix City 
during the time that Columbus was delisted. They 
then estimated both the effects on taxes for the city of 
Columbus and on the city’s hotel revenues.
For the city, they calculated an actual tax gain to 
the city of Columbus during the delisting period of 
$298,000. Although there was a loss of taxes on the 
missing 18,000 annual room-nights (over 4.3 years of 
delisting), they calculated that this loss was offset by 
what they believed would be higher net taxable rates 
for the hotels. They determined that this tax gain 
would occur owing to the absence of OTA transac-
tions, meaning that hotels did not have to pay an esti-
mated 20 percent in OTA commissions and resulting 
a higher net taxable rate. For this, they assumed that 
14.9 percent of transactions would otherwise have 
been taxed at a lower net rate owing to estimated 
OTA commissions. 
1 Brumby McLeod, Stephen W. Litvin, Kirk C. Heriot, An-
dres Jauregui, and Erin Dempsey. Goodbye Columbus: Accom-
modation Taxes and OTAs,  Cornell Hospitality Quarterly, Vol 59, 
No. 1 (February 2018), pp. 61–66 (doi:10.1177/1938965517704369).
The picture is likewise positive for the hotels, for 
a similar reason. McLeod and colleagues determined 
that the hotels were, on balance, better off without the 
OTA transactions. First, based on a city-wide ADR 
of $71.60, they estimated the loss of 18,000 annual 
room-nights over the delisting period at $5,542,000. 
This product is calculated as follows: (18k [annual lost 
rooms] × 4.3 [years delisted] × $71.60 [average delist-
ing period Columbus ADR].) This substantive loss is 
more than offset by reductions in OTA commissions 
of $9,257,000. That calculation is as follows: (1,009k 
[annual average number of room-nights sold in the city 
during delisting] × 4.3 [years delisted] × $71.60 [aver-
age delisting period Columbus ADR] × 14.9% [OTA 
normal market share] × 20% [average OTA commis-
sion]), for a net gain of $3,715,000. 
Based on this study, the result of putting the OTA 
genie back in the bottle in Columbus, Georgia, appears 
quite positive—so much so one might ask why the 
hotels bothered to relist!
This does not quite end the McLeod analysis, 
although further specific calculations are not possible. 
McLeod and his colleagues suggested that one pos-
sible reason that only 18,000 of the estimated 150,341 
annual rooms sold on OTAs prior to delisting (14.9% of 
1,009,000) were (apparently) lost to Phenix City is that 
this market is relatively small. While Phenix City is the 
next closest market it only has one-seventh of the room 
supply offered by Columbus (246,000 rooms in Phenix 
City versus 1,720,000 rooms in Columbus as of 2014). 
One could speculate that this supply imbalance might 
mean room-nights during the delisting were lost to 
other markets as well. The McLeod study also assumes 
that OTA delisting had no long-term impacts on pric-
ing strategy within the Columbus market, as revenue 
estimates are solely based on ADRs during the delisted 
period.
 
Figure 1: Hotel Performance Indices (Columbus/
Phenix City)
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A Deeper Dive Using RevPAR Indices
Working with co-author Saram Han, I published a 
CHQ article that indicated the difficulty of unraveling 
the true impacts of OTA delisting owing to supply 
changes, seasonality, and other factors not under con-
trol during the experiment.2 As a result, we proposed 
the use of indices, or relative performance, versus the 
use of absolute performance. We used the same data 
as that analyzed in the McLeod study (including per-
formance in Phenix City), as supplied by STR under 
an educational agreement known as the STR SHARE 
Center.3
Exhibit 1, reproduced from our CHQ research 
note, summarizes the average performance indices 
during the following three periods: (1) when all hotels 
were listed at OTAs, (2) when Columbus hotels were 
delisted at OTAs, and (3) after Columbus hotels were 
relisted at OTAs. As did McLeod and his colleagues, 
Han and I use aggregate market-level data. For ex-
ample, ADRs are total market revenue divided by total 
market rooms occupied. 
2 Chris K. Anderson and Saram Han. Living without OTAs—
Goodbye Columbus: Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle, Cornell 
Hospitality Quarterly, Vol 59, No. 1 (February 2018), pp. 67–69 (doi: 
10.1177/1938965517735907).
3 STR’s SHARE Center makes available a substantial volume 
of aggregate hotel industry data to colleges and universities by 
arrangement. See: str.com.
The table also includes ratios of the delisted 
period (labeled as “loss”) and the relisted periods (i.e., 
“recovery”) relative to performance prior to delisting. 
The ratios highlight the degree to which Columbus 
hotels lost control of their pricing and failed to recover 
even after relisting (relative to Phenix City), as relisted 
room rates are still 17.1-percent less than those prior 
to delisting. The use of relative performance (i.e., ADR 
in Columbus divided by the average of ADR in Phenix 
City plus that of Columbus) helps control for seasonal-
ity and general economic conditions. Note that we use 
this calculation of ADR in Columbus divided by the 
average of the two cities’ ADRs (versus simply divid-
ing the ADR in Columbus by the ADR in Phenix City) 
to avoid the possibility of double counting the losses 
in Columbus on top of gains in Phenix City. 
The table indicates that Columbus’s lower rates 
drove additional room-nights, since the occupancy 
index during both loss and recovery is greater than 
100 percent. At the same time, delisting and relisting 
diminished Columbus hotels’ overall performance, 
given that RevPAR levels never recovered (as shown 
by the RevPAR indices during loss and recovery of 
less than 100 percent).
Slow Recovery
For the remainder of this report, we extend our initial 
analysis beyond that published in the CHQ research 
note, both to include a longer recovery period (us-
Exhibit 1
Hotel performance indices (columbus/phenix city) 
revpar aDr Occupancy
listEd 1.21 1.22 0.99
dElistEd 1.09 1.07 1.02
rElistEd 1.11 1.01 1.10
loss 89.9% 87.6% 102.9%
rEcovEry 91.8% 82.9% 111.1%
 
Figure 1: Hotel Performance Indices (Columbus/
Phenix City)
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ing data through 2016 versus 2014 as in the prior two 
studies), and to calculate performance measures at the 
hotel level. This allows us to compare effects across 
chain scales and further to distinguish outcomes for 
branded and independent hotels.
Exhibit 2 displays RevPAR, ADR, and occupancy 
during the same three periods as in the table: before 
OTA delisting in Columbus (listed), during delisting 
(delisted), and after the listings were restored (rel-
isted). Similar to the table in Exhibit 1, the figure in 
Exhibit 2 illustrates that prior to delisting Columbus 
generated a rate premium over Phenix City, which 
translated into superior RevPAR performance. Follow-
ing delisting, Columbus room rates eroded quickly. 
Although these rate reductions generated modest 
occupancy gains, the result was dramatically reduced 
overall performance, as measured by RevPAR dur-
ing that period. Following relisting, Columbus hotels 
never recovered their pricing power. We see that 
ADRs continued to depreciate (relative to Phenix City), 
even as relisting generated sufficient demand to el-
evate RevPAR in Columbus (albeit not to pre-delisting 
levels).
Exhibits 1 and 2 would indicate that Columbus 
hotels fared poorly during delisting, losing consid-
erably more revenue than would previously have 
been represented by the estimated 18,000 lost annual 
room-nights. In fact, one might argue that the city’s 
hotels lost few, if any room-nights, given the increase 
in occupancy indices. However, Columbus hotels ag-
gressively reduced prices during the delisting period, 
resulting in a dramatic decrease in RevPAR (and total 
revenue). One thing to keep in mind is that revenues 
reported to STR are net revenues (that is, net of all 
OTA commissions), meaning that the RevPAR indices 
during the listed and delisted periods already have 
all OTA commission savings (or expenses) built in. 
Consequently, there is no need to make any assump-
tions on channel mix or commissions, as was required 
in the McLeod analysis. 
To gain further distance from the possible noise 
created by OTA listings, pricing, and commissions, we 
can create a cleaner set of indices by looking at hotels 
we expect to be the least affected by OTA delisting—
namely, lower chain scale branded hotels. In my 2009 
analysis of what I termed the billboard effect—or the 
impact of OTA listings upon non-OTA hotel book-
ings—I determined that the effect is lesser for branded 
hotels than for independent hotels.4 I found that the 
4 See: C.K. Anderson (2009). The Billboard Effect: Online 
Travel Agent Impact on Non-Ota Reservation Volume. Cornell 
Hospitality Report, Vol. 9, No. 16.
Exhibit 1
Hotel performance indices (columbus/phenix city) 
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effect decreased from 26 percent for independent 
hotels to as little as 7.5 percent for branded hotels. The 
reason for this is undoubtedly the breadth of cover-
age of the “brand.com” websites. We see an example 
of this strength in a hotel search at Marriott.com. A 
search for Phenix City, Alabama, returns a display of 
11 Marriott-branded hotels—one in Phenix City, six 
in Columbus, and four in Auburn, Alabama (about 30 
miles away). Similarly, a Phenix City search at Choice-
Hotels.com yields 12 hotels—two in Phenix City, sev-
en in Columbus, and three in Opelika, Alabama (about 
20 miles away). Given this overlap, even if Columbus 
hotels were delisted at an OTA, their brand counter-
parts in Phenix City (or other nearby location) may 
still be listed on the OTA. That could result in a web 
searcher gaining indirectly exposure to the delisted 
hotel if their research process involved OTA visits 
prior to hotel direct booking. This is a realistic scenario, 
as I wrote in a 2011 paper. At that time, I found that 
75 percent of all online direct hotel bookings were 
preceded by an OTA visit.5 Exhibit 3 (derived from 
5 See: C.K. Anderson (2011). Search, OTAs, and Online Book-
ing: An Expanded Analysis of the Billboard Effect. Cornell Hospital-
ity Report, Vol. 11, No. 8. This number had decreased to 65 percent 
in 2015. See: C.K. Anderson and S. Han. (2017). The Billboard Ef-
fect: Still Alive and Well. Cornell Hospitality Report, Vol. 17, No. 11.
details in my 2011 paper) summarizes differences in 
online behavior by hotel sub-brand for InterContinen-
tal Hotels Group (IHG). The hotel sub-brands from 
IHG in Exhibit 3 are arranged in order of ascending 
chain scale with StayBridge and Candlewood Suites, 
for instance, of lower chain scale than InterContinental 
Hotels. The table summarizes the sub-brand booking 
share and OTA visitation (average number of visits to 
OTAs prior to booking direct) by channel. The table 
indicates two broad themes. First, OTA bookings tend 
to be tilted towards higher chain scale sub-brands, as 
the InterContinental brand goes from an online direct 
share of 0.6 percent to a 10-fold increase of 5.7 percent 
at OTAs, whereas IHG’s Holiday Inn flag decreased 
from 80.1 percent to 73.2 percent. In addition, those 
who book higher chain scale inventory appear to 
do a lot more shopping, as indicated by the average 
number of OTA visits prior to an online direct book-
ing. One might infer, then, based on these two earlier 
papers, that we might expect delisting to have less 
impact on lower chain scale branded hotels owing to 
decreased OTA shopping and less OTA focus on these 
lower chain scale (branded) properties.
Returning to the analysis but keeping in mind the 
reduced effect of OTAs on branded properties, we see 
Exhibit 3
Ota versus direct consumer behavior
Hotel Sub-brand Online Direct booking Share Ota booking Share average # Ota visits*
Staybridge Suites 3.9 1.6 9.9
candlewood Suite 5.9 5.7 6.9
Holiday inn 80.1 73.2 11.4
crowne plaza Hotels 9.0 13.8 13.9
Hotel indigo 0.6 0 23.7
intercontinental Hotels 0.6 5.7 28.6
*online direct bookers
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Exhibit 4
branded hotel performance indices
that Exhibit 4, like Exhibit 1, displays average perfor-
mance indices across the three listing periods. How-
ever, Exhibit 4 displays average indices across hotels 
rather than across market indices. Panel A in Exhibit 
4 presents average indices for all properties, while 
Panel B shows average indices for branded midscale 
hotels and Panel C does the same for branded econo-
my hotels. Comparison of Panel A to Panels B and C 
indicates that the impacts of delisting are dramatically 
reduced for branded hotels. Further, this impact is less 
for economy properties than for midscale hotels, as 
indicated by the RevPAR figures. The overall market 
has recovered to 87 percent of prior RevPAR, while 
branded midscale hotels have gotten back to 96 per-
cent of their earlier RevPAR. However, branded econo-
my hotels are fully recovered and, in fact, stand at 103 
percent of their pre-delisting levels. As a caution, we 
note that Panel A from Exhibit 4 displays slightly dif-
ferent values than the table in Exhibit 1, because Table 
1 uses market-level data, while Exhibit 4 displays 
panel a: all properties
revpar aDr Occupancy
liStED 1.19 1.17 1.01
DEliStED 1.05 1.06 0.99
rEliStED 1.03 1.01 1.03
lOSS 88.3% 91.3% 97.8%
rEcOvEry 86.7% 86.4% 102.2%
panel b: branded midscale
liStED 1.15 1.09 1.06
DEliStED 1.06 1.09 0.97
rEliStED 1.09 1.1 0.99
lOSS 92.3% 100.1% 91.7%
rEcOvEry 95.5% 101.6% 93.5%
panel c: branded Economy 
liStED 0.97 0.96 1.01
DEliStED 0.94 0.94 1.02
rEliStED 0.99 0.92 1.08
lOSS 97.3% 98.2% 100.5%
rEcOvEry 103.0% 95.8% 107.2%
Cornell Hospitality Report • February 2018 • www.chr.cornell.edu  •  Vol. 18   No.  3 9
results averaged across hotels. We see that the greater 
the range in hotel sizes, the greater the potential for 
differences between the two sets of results.
Summary
The goal of this report is to provide an extended 
analysis of the effects on demand and revenue of 
OTA delisting upon hotel performance in Columbus, 
Georgia. Because the OTAs delisted all the city’s hotels 
for a time and then relisted them, we are presented 
the opportunity to analyze the effects of a natural 
experiment. In one study, McLeod and his colleagues 
conducted an analysis that found an estimated 18,000 
annual room-nights lost in Columbus as a result of 
delisting. The loss of 18,000 room-nights is based on a 
broad assumption that all demand lost from Colum-
bus spilled over to Phenix City, which seems to be a 
conservative approach. Using this estimate, they con-
cluded that, even given this loss of 18,000 room-nights, 
the city’s hotels actually benefited from delisting, 
based on the calculation that the loss in room-nights is 
more than offset by OTA commission savings. 
Starting with this analysis, Saram Han and I took 
a different approach and did not make any assump-
tions about lost room-nights. Instead, we compared 
relative performance of Columbus hotels to those in 
Phenix City. Through the use of indices we indicated 
substantial negative impacts of delisting in Columbus. 
Hotels dramatically dropped their prices during the 
delisting period. While they may have gained room-
nights, they clearly lost revenue owing to the deep rate 
cuts. This analysis provides a conservative estimate of 
a loss of 2.8 percent of revenue during delisting during 
this period. Note that this estimate already included 
any gains in commission savings.
This report extends our analysis through the use 
of hotel specific data (versus market aggregate data). 
Using this approach, we found that the impacts of 
delisting were not the same for all hotels. Instead, we 
found that RevPAR losses declined with decreas-
ing chain scale, and further are lessened for branded 
hotels. 
In the end, Columbus’s hotels did relist with the 
OTAs when given the opportunity. Most saw a subse-
quent uptick in RevPAR, but some upper scale hotels 
have yet to regain all the yardage that they lost during 
the delisting. Thus, it is difficult to conclude that the 
sequence of events that led to the delisting and relist-
ing was beneficial to the city’s hotels. n
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